Define "Me"

[Pedersen]

I don't doubt that a few of you will immediately answer the thread title with a few colorful metaphors, but that's not what I'm actually asking about in this thread.

Warning: I intend to fully take apart any and all answers that come into this thread. I want a definition that can withstand my scrutiny, because I want to be able to use that definition later. This will not be an easy thread to participate in, I'm sorry to say. I do hope that some of you will be up to the challenge even still, though.

I'm asking about a purely philosophical question, and one that I'm not sure any ready answer exists. Heck, I'm not even sure I can phrase the question clearly.

The closest I can find actually comes from Babylon 5, and is the question that was asked by the Vorlons time and again:

Who are you?

Think about it carefully for a minute. You're likely to start naming things about yourself such as your name, your ancestry, and identifying physical characteristics. But none of those are an actual description of who you are.

Once you realize that, you're likely to switch your answers into personality traits, hobbies, and the like. But again, none of those items actually answers the question of who you are.

All of those traits in the paragraphs above? They are things about you.

I wind up asking this question due to a response from Flyndaran in a separate thread, but I'll quote his reply here:

I could say that that much brain damage makes it so the creature that recovers is not me. That keeps both our interpretations true.

Are you simply the results of the processing power of an organic computer that we call the brain? Are you more than your biology? Are you nothing more than the sum of your experiences and the semi-unpredictable firing of neurons in response to those experiences? Is the bit of self that makes you into you somehow connected to the idea of a soul? If yes, what is the soul, such that it makes that much difference? If no, what about you makes you you?

Oh, and before any of you decide to use it, I can't accept the very Zen answer of "I am me." I'm not the Inquisitor. I need something more definitive than that.

So, all of that having been said...

Who are you?

[BroomJockey]

In a physiological sense, I am the cellular organism that is directed from the impulses of a bundle of neurons, with the sole goal of continuing cellular mitosis for as long as possible to increase chance of spawning progeny to pass down the chemical code that created the cellular make-up in the first place. As long as the neurons continue to fire impulses and have an effect on my cells, I continue in a meatspace sense.

In a neurological sense, I am the sum total of my experiences, emotions, and feelings. I am a fluid construct, never the same from one moment to the next. Parts of me may be added to or removed, but so long as a significant portion is unchanged from the previous concept of me, then I continue in a neurological sense.

In a metaphysical sense, I am what others perceive me to be, and the reactions that others have to my actions. My neurology and physiology combine to act out in manners which other combinations of neurology and physiology will interpret and respond to. How I think of myself is immaterial as only their concept of me will shade their responses, and my actions may influence theirs, thus I am also the effect I have on others. As long as others react to me, and my actions have influenced their behaviour, I continue in a metaphysical sense.

[Pedersen]

Actually, this is a pretty decent start, I must say. Taking this one apart actually takes some effort from me.

In a physiological sense, I am the cellular organism that is directed from the impulses of a bundle of neurons, with the sole goal of continuing cellular mitosis for as long as possible to increase chance of spawning progeny to pass down the chemical code that created the cellular make-up in the first place. As long as the neurons continue to fire impulses and have an effect on my cells, I continue in a meatspace sense.

What about a clone then? If this definition is to be accepted, wouldn't a clone then be another "you"? Especially if this definition is all that there is to being you? And what if the original is destroyed? Is the clone you? Has the self moved on and become something else?

If the clone is not you, then this definition is incomplete: The clone, being a complete copy of your physiological self is missing something that makes you into you.

If the clone is you, and the original is not destroyed, then the next question becomes even more interesting: At what point does the clone stop being you? Especially in light of your response on the neurological side of the definition:

but so long as a significant portion is unchanged from the previous concept of me, then I continue in a neurological sense.

If the clone is a complete and instantaneous copy of you at a given point in time, at what point does it stop being you? It will take some amount of time, as it will be completely identical to you as of the time the clone is made. As a result, even mixing the neurological sense with the physical sense of the question produces issues: Are we really no more than a meat sack?

I don't think we can be just a meat sack. If a clone is actually made (through some means), and that clone is a complete and instant copy of me, it is still not me. There exists something that makes it different. Is that something really just the fact that it resides in a different group of cells?

And if that something is not just being a different group of cells, then what is it?

In a neurological sense, I am the sum total of my experiences, emotions, and feelings. I am a fluid construct, never the same from one moment to the next. Parts of me may be added to or removed, but so long as a significant portion is unchanged from the previous concept of me, then I continue in a neurological sense.

This produces three issues to ponder.

First, with the way technology is progressing, it is not unreasonable to believe that we will, possibly within our lifetimes, be able to download our memories onto a computer, and even interact with those memories as a separate entity. In other words, we would be able to carry on conversations with ourselves as we existed at a specific point in time (namely, when we downloaded our memories).

Is the entity that I am interacting with then me? If we go by the purely neurological sense, it would be. However, I seriously doubt that people would accept that. After all, that's a computer, it's not me. Something still separates myself from the entity I'm interacting with.

Again we come back to the meat sack: It makes me think that, somehow, the body that we reside in matters a great deal in the idea of defining oneself.

The second issue that gets brought up by this is the amount of the brain that holds our consciousness. People have often heard that we only use 10% of our brains. That is, of course, false: We use 10% of our brains to house our consciousness. The remaining 90% is responsible for everything not related to our consciousness. This includes such things as breathing, blinking, autonomic reflexes, etc.

So, if that 10% is damaged, we would be able to state in the neurological sense that that is not me anymore if enough of it gets damaged. But how much is enough? Is it only 10%? 1%? Does it require 100% damage before we are no longer ourselves?

The third issue comes from a key phrase in your definition of the neurological sense:

but so long as a significant portion is unchanged from the previous concept of me, then I continue in a neurological sense.

I can guarantee that I have had a major change from the time I was 5 years old. Does that mean I am no longer me? At what point did I stop being me, and become someone else? Was it when I hit puberty? When I graduated high school? College? Got my first professional job?

I'm not sure the neurological sense is sufficient, by itself, to define "me".

In a metaphysical sense, I am what others perceive me to be, and the reactions that others have to my actions. My neurology and physiology combine to act out in manners which other combinations of neurology and physiology will interpret and respond to. How I think of myself is immaterial as only their concept of me will shade their responses, and my actions may influence theirs, thus I am also the effect I have on others. As long as others react to me, and my actions have influenced their behaviour, I continue in a metaphysical sense.

Reading this, I wind up feeling like you are stating that, in a metaphysical sense, we are all nothing but what others perceive us to be. Obvious counter examples (to my understanding of what you are saying) would be the number of people who call hard working retail workers lazy. We have far too many stories of just that phenomenon on CS for me to be willing to accept the metaphysical sense on its own.

As another issue, in the metaphysical sense, you have granted all of us immortality. My actions will affect people around me, and cause them to undertake other actions. Some of those actions will be taken around still others, ad infinitum. The end result is that my actions will have consequences throughout the remainder of the human race (though with rapidly diminishing effects after the current generation). In the metaphysical sense, I am now immortal.

Combining all three of these definitions, though, might have a potential resolution: I am a physiological being, with a neurological state, and a metaphysical state.

But, aren't all of those items simply items about me, instead of being who I am?

I'm not fully convinced. All of this seems to be a way to describe things about me, not describing me. I think we've still not hit upon the way to define ourselves, not yet.

[Greenday]

So you are basically asking if we believe in dualism, materialism, or idealism?

Dualism would be the obvious choice, but if I was to lean towards one side or the other, I'd choose materialism. My body and my world are not products of an imagination so I cannot honestly believe in a idealism reality only. It all comes down to what our mind/soul is: a result of an actual form or synapses from our nervous system.

[Flyndaran]

Me is that which exists when all otherness is removed. At the present that is determined and limited by my brain's structure which is formed by genetics, environment internal and external, and chance.

[BroomJockey]

Me is that which exists when all otherness is removed.

Except that without otherness, everything about you loses definition. You cannot say you are intelligent without someone else being stupid. You cannot say you are selfless unless someone else is selfish. You cannot say you are good without someone being evil. So what is left of you without the other?

I've not had time to fully consider Pedersen's reply to my post (re: it was long so I skipped it for now), but if we're unable to define a person in absence of characteristics, there's only one answer as I can see it.

Cogito ergo sum. I think, therefore I am. Me is the one who thinks. Anything else about me can change, but as long as I still think, I still am, and am, for lack of a better term, a "me."

[Pedersen]

So you are basically asking if we believe in dualism, materialism, or idealism?

No, I'm not asking what you believe in. I'm asking you to tell me what it is about you that makes you into you. I'm asking you to say why an exact copy of you is not you, but rather someone or something else.

People often state that, in the case of serious brain damage, the person who recovers is not the same person who was injured. I am asking about the difference between those people. What makes them different? Why are they not considered to be the same people by those around them, even though they are the same person in every other way?

It all comes down to what our mind/soul is: a result of an actual form or synapses from our nervous system.

Is that the answer? We are simply our souls? But then, does that mean that if we are severely enough injured that our souls depart us, and we get new ones?

Me is that which exists when all otherness is removed. At the present that is determined and limited by my brain's structure which is formed by genetics, environment internal and external, and chance.

So, how do you reconcile the statement that I quoted above? If you experience severe brain damage, you yourself have stated that the "creature" who wakes up is not you. And yet, the damage is internal. Your brain's structure has been altered, but your genetics have not. Neither has the environment.

Are you therefore saying that you are nothing more than the structure of your brain? If so, what about the idea of an exact copy? Assume for a moment that an exact copy of your brain can be built. Let's even make it organic, such that it shares your DNA. Finally, we'll throw in some "Matrix" type virtual reality that provides an exact duplicate of earth, so that the brain itself is incapable of perceiving any differences. Why is that not "you"?

All of that is meant to show that you have failed to answer one key thing: What is this "otherness"? If it is anything outside of your body, then let's consider a fairly gruesome example: What happens if we cut off your non-dominant hand? Are you still you? What about if we take the whole arm? Both arms? Legs? At what point do you stop being you? How much of your body constitutes "otherness"?

Cogito ergo sum. I think, therefore I am. Me is the one who thinks. Anything else about me can change, but as long as I still think, I still am, and am, for lack of a better term, a "me."

So, are we nothing more than our thoughts? If so, which ones? Our conscious thoughts can be radically different from our unconscious ones (consider our sleep states for instance). Since we are (normally) unable to recall much of anything from our sleep states, many of us could be said to be two people inhabiting the same body with this definition: Our sleeping self, and our wakeful self.

As another example, what happens to someone who suffers full on amnesia? Complete loss of all memory? Are they truly a new person, distinct from the old one? What if that same person has family and friends who knew and cared about the old person still around?

If those family and friends take in the "new" person, and still care for that person, is that "new" person a distinctly different person, or is it still the same person, just wiped clean and starting from scratch? And if it is still the same person, doesn't that mean that our thoughts are not the defining characteristic that we make them out to be in this definition?

[Greenday]

Is that the answer? We are simply our souls? But then, does that mean that if we are severely enough injured that our souls depart us, and we get new ones?

No, no, not at all what I said. The question you quoted just sums up, in my opinion, what defines what people call a soul. If you choose the former (an actual form), then you are either dualistic or you are idealistic. But, if you are like me and believe in the latter, you are either dualistic or materialistic.

As I said, I fully believe in the physical world. We have proof of it every day. We have proof that our mind has thoughts that can be based on chemical synapses and such. But we don't have any proof of a soul being its own entity.

[BroomJockey]

If so, which ones?

Immaterial. Simply any thoughts. Choosing thoughts leads to description of the person, rather than who they are.

As another example, what happens to someone who suffers full on amnesia? Complete loss of all memory? Are they truly a new person, distinct from the old one? What if that same person has family and friends who knew and cared about the old person still around?

If those family and friends take in the "new" person, and still care for that person, is that "new" person a distinctly different person, or is it still the same person, just wiped clean and starting from scratch? And if it is still the same person, doesn't that mean that our thoughts are not the defining characteristic that we make them out to be in this definition?

It may be a new person, but to themselves, they are still a "me." Any memories and such is simply about them. As long as they think, they're a "me." Thus, as you wanted, we have a definition which doesn't depend on describing the person.

[LewisLegion]

Me is a sum of all those things.

Me is what is, when you mix my physiology, my mentality, my spirituality, my philosophy, my likes, dislikes, phobias, preferences, sexual idenity, history, influences, and shortcomings. All add up to make the unique individual with the unique viewpoint that is me.

When my brain is damaged a good deal of these things change...the ingredients that make me unique are no longer the same. So I am not the 'me' that others knew, but I am still a 'me'. Just a different one. But it's not just limited to damage but growth. In ten years, I may not be the 'me' that most remember, though most fundamental ingredients may be the same some are not and therefore, I am still not the same 'me', even though I am a 'me'.

When you ask people to define 'me' they naturally start listing their ingredients. When you ask people to define 'cake' they will do the same thing...cake is what you get when you mix all these items together.

Me is what you get when you mix all the questions together. No one thing can define 'me', just as no one ingredient can define 'cake'.

[Slytovhand]

We have proof of it every day.

Actually, no you don't. If the Idealists have it right, or the Matrix idea is correct, then that's all just one big pile of bollocks. Which is exactly how "Cogito, ergo sum" came about.... what if all this was fake?

Pedersen - to paraphrase Bill Clinton, what exactly do you mean by the word 'who'?

[Greenday]

Actually, no you don't. If the Idealists have it right, or the Matrix idea is correct, then that's all just one big pile of bollocks. Which is exactly how "Cogito, ergo sum" came about.... what if all this was fake?

We absolutely have proof of it. When it's cold out, do you not feel the sting of the wind? Do you not taste food in your mouth? Smell? Hear? See? These are all things that help prove that the physical world is the real part.

[crashhelmet]

Senses are nothing more than interpretations form the mind. Electrical impulses in our brains.

As Slyt pointed out with his "Cogito ergo Sum" comment, Descartes strived to prove absolute certainty. His Dream Conjecture was based on the possibility that we might be dreaming at this moment. How do I know if I'm dreaming about eating this orange? How do i know I'm not dreaming that i can smell it? Taste it? His Demon Conjecture was based on the possibility of a demon (or higher power) controlling what he wanted him to know and experience. Therefore, everything was doubtable except for one thing. Cogito ergo Sum. I think, therefore I am. I am the only thing that is absolutely certain. I exist in my world. Without me, my world would not exist.

To answer the OP, who am I? I am the product of the combination of creation and evolution, shaped and influenced by the experiences "life" has brought me.

CH

[Kalli]

Personally, I think the reason you are finding this definition so confusing, P, is that you are thinking in absolutes. Almost nothing is absolute.

For example, you have trouble with the concept of one's consciousness being how they define themselves, because what if they are in an accident and they lose some of that consciousness? Do they cease to be "me" when they have lost 6% brain function? 50%? 99%?

My answer is, there is no set ratio or content quota we have to maintain to remain "me", physical or otherwise. The three senses that Broomjockey illustrated (very astutely, I might add); Physiological, Neurological and Metaphysical, are all constantly changing, growing, fluidly moving. If you are thinking in absolutes, then the "me" that you were when you started reading this sentence no longer exists. Absolutes do not apply.

That's not to say that if I were involved in a car accident and became badly brain damaged, or my body was mangled beyond repair, that I would still classify myself as the same I always have been. Nor does it mean that I can call myself a different person than I was 30 seconds ago. It's all relative: 30 seconds ago I was 99.99999999(whatever)% the same as now, but after the car accident I might be 39% the same as I am now. BUT in both cases, I am still 100% me IN THAT EXACT MOMENT.

The uncertainty we all face with this question is that there is no point of reference. We cannot find an absolute answer to anything without a point of reference. It's the same as saying "How far away, in kilometers, is the eiffel tower?" From where? From a cafe in Paris, or from my house in Australia?

We cannot absolutely answer a question that has no point of reference. However, we can discover that there still is an answer; it's just relative.

[Kalli]

Have you abandoned this thread, P? I was really interested to see your take on my thoughts, and others' thoughts as well